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#2A-3/l/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DON A. MCLAUGHLIN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-103 66 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK 
Respondent. 
DON A. MCLAUGHLIN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Charging party Don A. McLaughlin (McLaughlin) excepts to 
the decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) dismissing, as deficient, his 
improper practice charge against the City School District of 
the City of New York (District). The charge alleges that the 
District violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it terminated him 
in March 1988 in violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the District and McLaughlin's bargaining 
unit representative, refused to respond to correspondence 
regarding a grievance filed in connection with his 
termination, advised him that he was not entitled to grieve 
his termination because of the availability of other 
Board - U-10366 
-2 
administrative procedures, and failed to respond to his 
request for a meeting with the District's Chancellor. 
The Director dismissed the aspects of the charge 
relating to McLaughlin's termination upon the ground that the 
events complained of occurred more than four months prior to 
the filing of the charge. The Director also dismissed the 
charge insofar as it alleges violations §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act for failure to allege facts which could establish that 
the District's conduct was improperly motivated. 
Finally, the Director's dismissal of so much of the 
charge as alleges a violation of §§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the 
Act is based upon determinations by this Board that 
individual bargaining unit members lack standing to allege 
violations of those sections of the Act, which it is the 
right and responsibility of the duly certified or recognized 
bargaining agent to assert. 
As we stated in Queens College of the City University of 
New York (Soffer), 21 PERB J3024, at 3055 (1988): 
[T]he right to seek redress of 
[§209-a.l(d) and (e)] violations by an 
employer flows to the employee's 
bargaining agent, which has the duty and 
right to negotiate on behalf of its 
members . . . [A]n individual bargaining 
unit member does not have the right to 
act independently and in the place of the 
bargaining agent in the filing of charges 
relating to alleged violations of the 
employer's bargaining duties. 
Accordingly, we find that the Director properly 
dismissed so much of the charge as alleges violations of 
Board - U-10366 
-3 
§§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Act. 
In his exceptions, McLaughlin asserts contractual 
violations by the District in his termination, performance 
rating, and the failure to respond to his request for a 
conference with the District's Chancellor. All of these 
matters are outside the scope of this Board's jurisdiction 
pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, because they involve 
nothing more than efforts to redress contractual violations 
which we are not empowered to address. 1/ 
Also in his exceptions, McLaughlin asserts that the 
limitation period contained in §204.1(a) of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), which requires the filing of a charge 
within four months of the allegedly improper conduct, should 
not apply until internal redress procedures have been 
exhausted. However, the Director properly found that the 
date from which the limitation period for the filing of 
improper practice charges runs is the date when the charging 
party knows, or should have known, that the respondent "has 
engaged in or is engaging in an improper practice", that is, 
the date when the conduct giving rise to the charge took 
^/section 205.5(d) provides, in relevant part, that: 
"The Board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement 
between an employer and an employee organization and shall 
not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such 
an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice." 
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place,-2/ and the filing period is not tolled by the 
availability and use of other administrative procedures.-2/ 
Finally, McLaughlin excepts to the Director's 
determination that the charge sets forth no facts which could 
support a finding that the District acted for the purpose of 
interfering with his rights under the Act. However, no 
allegations appear anywhere in the charge, either as 
originally filed or as amended, which would establish any 
connection between the adverse actions complained of by 
McLaughlin and his rights of organization under §202 of the 
Act, his right of representation under §2 03 of the Act, or 
any other rights conferred by the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Director's decision is 
affirmed, and IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
2/see Rules §204.1(a)(1). See also State of New York 
XGOER1, 22.PERB 53009 (1989). 
3/see County of Suffolk Department of Labor Relations, 19 
PERB J3003 (1986); NYC Transit Authority fKincfl • 10 
PERB ?[3077 (1977) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-•—• --and- - CASENO. "U-T04"09 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Thomas C. Barry excepts to the dismissal by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), 
as deficient, of his improper practice charge which alleges 
that the United University Professions (UUP) violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it filed an improper practice charge against 
Barry's employer, the State of New York (SUNY). UUP's charge 
alleges that SUNY unilaterally increased the length of the 
workyear for bargaining unit members (including Barry) 
without negotiation, in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act.-i/ He asserts that the position taken by UUP in filing 
its charge against SUNY does not represent his interests, is 
•i/That improper practice charge, Case No. U-9694, is 
pending before an assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
and is not before us at this time. 
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in fact in conflict with his interests, and that UUP was not 
entitled to file its improper practice charge against SUNY 
without first ascertaining whether Barry individually 
supported the filing of such a charge. 
-'-•-•'-•- The" Director' dismissed""th"e improper 
the ground that it contains no factual allegations supportive 
of a claim of improper motivation or other breach of the duty 
of fair representation. 
As found by the Director, no factual allegations are 
offered in support of Barry's claim that the improper 
practice charge filed by UUP against SUNY conflicts with his 
interests. Indeed, Barry appears to allege nothing more than 
his philosophical disagreement with UUP's determination to 
challenge an alleged unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment. However, as pointed out by the 
Director in his decision, the fact that an individual 
bargaining unit member may oppose the filing of an improper 
practice charge, and even may have interests which conflict 
with the interests of other bargaining unit members on whose 
behalf the charge is brought, does not give rise to an 
improper practice.-2-^ Furthermore, there is nothing 
inherently improper in UUP's filing of a charge seeking 
^/see Faculty Ass'n of Hudson Valley Community College 
(Dansereau) , 15 PERB ?[3080 (1982) . 
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enforcement of its statutory right to negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment. 
It is beyond cavil that an employee organization is 
entitled to broad latitude in the negotiation of collective 
— bargain±ng~~agreements- for bargaining- unit~membei:s,^' and~in 
the determination whether to enforce its right to 
collectively negotiate under the Act, absent improper 
motivation in the making of such determinations. It is also 
beyond dispute that the employee organization is entitled to 
make its determinations on behalf of all bargaining unit 
members generally, whether they are union members or not, and 
whether they pay agency fees or not. Assuming that the 
employee organization otherwise comports with its duty of 
fair representation, the fact that some of its decisions may 
adversely affect some bargaining unit members does not give 
rise to a violation of the Act.4/ Barry makes no claim, in 
any event, that he is adversely affected by UUP's filing of a 
charge. 
In view of Barry's failure to establish any facts 
supportive of his claim that UUP violated the Act by its 
filing of an improper practice charge alleging a failure by 
^•/civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. (Rooney) , 20 PERB 
53062 (1987). 
4/see, e.g., Plainview-Old Bethpaqe CSD and Local 237, 
IBT, 7 PERB 1[3058 (1974). 
Board - U-10409 -4 
his employer to negotiate in good faith, IT IS ORDERED that 
this charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/ Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
l ^ _ ^* r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-932 6 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (PAUL H. JANIS, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
THOMAS P. RYAN, ESQ. (BARBARA A. JACCOMA, ESQ. and 
SHEILA GARVEY, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Board 
of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
decision which upheld in part an improper practice charge 
filed by the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (UFT). The charge alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it refused to negotiate upon request the salaries 
to be paid to unit employees working in the District's 1987 
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twelve-month educational program. 1/ 
The District does not deny that wages are a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. Instead, its defense to the charge 
rests primarily upon two points. First, it denies any 
refusal to negotiate a wage rate for employees working during 
the months of July and August 1987, and affirmatively asserts 
that it in fact had negotiated with the UFT a rate of pay for 
the at-issue work, which is set forth in the parties' 1984-87 
collective bargaining agreement at Article 15 (entitled 
"Rates of Pay and Working Conditions of Per Session 
Teachers"). Alternatively, the District argues that Article 
20 of the agreement (entitled "Matters Not Covered") covers 
the issue sought to be negotiated. Second, the District 
contends that it did nothing more than establish an initial 
rate of pay for a new program without bargaining, which, it 
asserts, it was entitled to do pursuant to this Board's 
holdings in Churchville-Chili CSD. 17 PERB [^3055 (1984) and 
County of Tompkins, 15 PERB K3092 (1982). 
The circumstances giving rise to the charge are briefly 
set forth as follows: in February 1987, the New York State 
•1/The ALT dismissed allegations made by the UFT that the 
District violated the Act by disseminating information 
concerning the program to some unit employees contrary to 
prior practice, and refusing to negotiate the impact of 
implementation of the new twelve-month educational program. 
The UFT does not except to the dismissal of these aspects of 
the charge, and they are not now before us. 
2/The ALT decision, located at 21 PERB ^4514 (1988), 
contains a detailed statement of facts, which will not be 
repeated here, except as necessary to explain our holdings. 
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Education Department issued guidelines for implementation of 
a program created by Chapter 683 of the Laws of 1986, enacted 
by the New York State Legislature, which required school 
districts to make available to students with handicapping 
conditions of a certain severity, a twelve-month school year. 
Immediately thereafter, the UFT, by its coordinator of 
negotiations, requested negotiations with respect to the 
terms and conditions of employment of persons to be utilized 
to carry out the program for the upcoming summer of 1987. At 
a meeting of the parties on March 11, 1987, representatives 
of the District informed the UFT that it had determined to 
provide the services mandated by Chapter 683 of the Laws of 
198 6 through a "new per session activity to begin in July 
1987". Having determined that the program would be 
implemented as a "per session activity", the Board contended 
that the 1984-87 collective bargaining agreement between the 
parties represents the result of negotiations concerning 
rates of pay for per session employees and that no further 
bargaining was required. In essence, the District contended 
that it was entitled to institute a new program, that it was 
entitled to establish the new program as a "per session 
activity", and that it had already negotiated the rate of pay 
for per session activities, as referenced by Article 15 of 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
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Notwithstanding its position that it had no further duty 
to bargain the wage rate for employees working in the 
Chapter 683 program for the summer of 1987, the District 
expressed its willingness to the UFT to negotiate the wage 
rate for employees working in the program for subsequent 
years, and expressed a willingness to negotiate all terms and 
conditions of employment for employees working in the summer 
1987 program, except the wage rate. 
It is our finding that the ALJ correctly concluded, 
based upon the evidence before her, that the wage rate for 
bargaining unit members employed in the new program mandated 
by Chapter 683 of the Laws of 1986 and first implemented by 
the District in July 1987 was a new program and one not 
covered or contemplated by Article 15 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement.-3-/ That Article defines per 
session activities by listing specific programs covered by 
1/ 
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered several 
arbitration awards presented by both parties which have 
interpreted the language of Article 15. According to the 
Intrator award, the District then argued that a particular 
at-issue assignment was not a per session activity because 
it did "not constitute a per session activity within the 
meaning of the [parties1] Agreement, nor was it the 
Chancellor's intent in Special Circular 5, to enlarge the 
coverage of the contract." The award also references several 
Chancellor's decisions, several of which found that new 
programs were not per session activities because they were 
not listed in the agreement. The ALJ accorded appropriate 
weight to this and the other awards received in concluding 
that the parties had not negotiated any agreement that any 
new program deemed by the District to be a per session 
activity payable at the contractual wage rate was in fact a 
per session activity. 
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the Article.4/ No evidence was offered by the District to 
suggest that the Chapter 683 program falls within any of the 
enumerated activities of Article 15. In fact, the District's 
witnesses acknowledge that the Chapter 683 program is a "new" 
program, but contend that it has, on many previous occasions, 
established new programs as per session activities, without 
objection from the UFT. As the ALJ found, while the Act 
authorizes an employer to continue prior action without 
seeking negotiations pursuant to past practice, such practice 
does not negate the employer's duty to negotiate after demand 
is made upon it. 
5/ 
In its post-hearing brief to the ALJ, the District 
argued, for the first time, that Article 20 of its agreement 
4/Article 15E of the parties' agreement provides as 
follows: 
Definitions The following are per session 
activities within the meaning of this Article: 
vacation day camps; after school centers; evening 
community and youth and adult centers; evening 
elementary schools for adults; summer evening 
elementary schools for adults; fundamental adult 
education day classes; summer day high schools; 
summer evening high schools; summer junior high 
schools; summer special day schools, day treatment 
centers, institutional settings; summer day 
elementary schools; evening high and trade schools; 
the special after-school instructional help 
program; and extra-curricular athletic and non-
athletic programs in day academic and vocational 
high schools, day junior high schools and special 
day schools, day treatment centers and 
institutional settings. 
^•/county of Tompkins, 10 PERB [^3 066 (1977) ; Onondaga-
Madison BOCES, 13 PERB J3015 (1980), aff 'd, 82 A.D.2d 691, 
14 PERB f7025 (3d Dep't 1981). 
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with the UFT ("Matters Not Covered") should be considered as 
a defense to the charge. The ALT rejected this contention 
upon the ground that as the District had not raised the issue 
of waiver or contractual coverage as an affirmative defense 
in its answer, it could not do so following the conclusion of 
the hearing in the matter, citing our decision in NYC Transit 
Authority, 20 PERB [^3037 (1987), conf'd. A.D. 2d , 
22 PERB 57001, (2d Dep't Feb. 24, 1989). In that case, we 
held, at 3065, that "the defense of waiver (or negotiation to 
conclusion of a subject covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement) is an affirmative defense, which is required by 
our Rules to be pleaded in the answer to a charge." In 
reaching this holding, we found it significant that the 
employer had not, at any time prior to its post-hearing 
memorandum, either argued or presented evidence concerning 
the defense then raised and that the employee organization 
was not on notice of the defense prior to or during the 
hearing. 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this matter, 
and find no evidence of reliance by the District upon 
Article 2 0 in its defense to the instant charge, whether as 
pleaded in its answer or raised at the hearing before the 
ALT. We accordingly affirm the determination of the ALT to 
exclude from consideration the District's Article 2 0 defense. 
We further note that as a factual matter the District has 
clearly and consistently argued, from its answer to its brief 
to this Board, that the wage rate for employees working in 
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the Chapter 683 program is a matter which is covered by the 
parties1 collective bargaining agreement at Article 15, 
contrary to its post-hearing claim that this is a matter 
which is not covered by the agreement, and therefore subject 
to Article 20 thereof. 
The final basis upon which the District excepts to the 
ALJ's decision finding it in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act, is that the imminence of the implementation date of the 
Chapter 683 program, together with the right which it has to 
establish initial terms and conditions for a new program, 
justify its refusal to engage in bargaining for the summer of 
1987, while expressing a willingness to engage in bargaining 
concerning wage rates for subsequent years. The ALJ found, 
and we agree, that while the District was in fact entitled to 
establish an initial wage rate and other terms and conditions 
of employments for persons to be employed in the Chapter 683 
program, the initial establishment did not confer upon the 
District the right to refuse to negotiate for all time the 
terms and conditions of employment for employees in the 1987 
program. Even if bargaining had extended beyond the 1987 
program, it is in fact commonplace for parties to negotiate 
retroactive payments to bargaining unit members. In any 
event, the District failed to meet its burden of proving that 
negotiations could not reasonably have taken place prior to 
implementation of the 1987 Chapter 683 program. In fact, the 
record supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ that the 
Board - U-9326 
-8 
District refused to engage in bargaining concerning the wage 
rate of unit members, not because it was impossible for it to 
do so, but because it considered that it had already done so 
and that Article 15 of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement entitled it to determine unilaterally that its new 
program would be treated as a per session activity.-6-/ 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ 
finding that the District violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act by 
refusing,^/ on March 11, 1987, UFT's demand to negotiate the 
rate of pay of unit employees working in the District's 
twelve-month educational program established pursuant to 
Chapter 683 of the Laws of 1986 is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District cease and 
desist from refusing to negotiate with UFT regarding the rate 
of pay of unit employees working in the District•s twelve-
s/The District asserts that the UFT's charge in essence seeks 
to compel negotiation about whether new programs will be 
instituted. We do not construe the charge, or the ALJ 
decision, as seeking or affording such a result. The 
decision to establish a new program is clearly a management 
prerogative and the wage to be paid to persons carrying out 
that program is just as clearly a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
2/The District argues that the ALJ erred in finding a 
"refusal" to bargain, and excepts to the finding that the 
District admitted a refusal to bargain in its answer. The 
ALJ decision is appropriately read, however, to find that the 
District affirmatively alleged an absence of a duty to 
further negotiate because negotiations had taken place and 
the contract covers the issue. The ALJ found, and we agree, 
that the issue of wages for the Chapter 683 program was not 
covered by the parties' agreement and accordingly had not 
been negotiated, and that the denial of a duty to negotiate 
was therefore improper and violative of the Act. 
Board - U-9326 -9 
month educational program for 1987^/ established pursuant to 
Chapter 683 of the Laws of 1986, and that it post notice in 
the form attached at all locations used to post written 
communications to unit employees.-9-/ 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
C-xsb 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IA^UUZ^Z0* 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member J 
£/ln review of the District's clear expressions of 
willingness to negotiate wage rates for any Chapter 683 
program implemented in 1988 and thereafter, and the absence 
of any claim to the contrary by UFT, the Board's order is 
directed specifically to the 1987 program. 
^/The District excepts to the remedial relief recommended 
by the ALJ, but does so upon the ground that the finding of 
violation is erroneous and that no remedy is accordingly 
required. Having affirmed the AKJ's finding of violation, we 
also adopt the recommended remedial relief. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLICL EMPLOYMENT BELATIONS^BOARD-
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York in the unit represented 
by the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
that the District will not refuse to negotiate with UFT regarding 
the rate of pay of unit employees working in the District's 
twelve-month educational program for 1987 established pursuant 
to Chapter 683 of the Laws of 1986.. 
Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS1 UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CASE NO. C-3001 
Employer, 
-and-
DEER PARK UNIT, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
CHAPTER, LOCAL 870, CSEA, INC., 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM MONAHAN and MARY WINIARSKI, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8184 
DEER PARK UNIT, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
CHAPTER, LOCAL 870, CSEA, INC., 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM MONAHAN and MARY WINIARSKI, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8449 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
and DEER PARK UNIT, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
CHAPTER, LOCAL 870, CSEA, INC., 
Respondents. 
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In the Matter of 
WILLIAM MONAHAN and MARY WINIARSKI, 
CHAIRPERSONS, DEER PARK SCHOOL BUS 
DRIVERS1 UNION, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8450 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
and DEER PARK UNIT, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 
CHAPTER, LOCAL 870, CSEA, INC., 
Respondents. 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS' UNION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8687 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
KREISBERG & MAITLAND, P.C. (JEFFREY L. KREISBERG, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner and Charging 
Parties 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN, P.C. (ROBERT E. SAPIR, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Employer/Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., for Intervenor/Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In Case No. C-3001, the Director dismissed the petition 
of the Deer Park School Bus Drivers• Union (Union), which 
sought to remove those employees of the Deer Park Union Free 
School District (District) employed in its Transportation 
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Department from an overall unit of nonprofessional employees 
represented by the Deer Park Unit, Suffolk Educational 
Chapter, Local 870, CSEA, Inc. (CSEA) and to represent them 
in a separate unit. The decision of the Director comes to us 
on the exceptions filed by the Union. 
Concurrently with the Director's decision, the 
Administrative Law Judge (AKT) disposed of four improper 
practice charges filed by the Union or by William Monahan and 
Mary Winiarski, which charges related to the representation 
dispute. After the dismissal of various allegations in the 
charges filed in Case Nos. U-8184 and U-8449, there remained 
for determination the allegations that CSEA violated its duty 
of fair representation by not challenging the District when 
it allegedly altered certain terms and conditions of 
employment without negotiations, when it allegedly refused to 
appeal several grievances to arbitration, and when it 
allegedly failed to notify the grievants of that decision. 
The ALJ dismissed all aspects of the charges in these two 
cases. Making a credibility determination in favor of CSEA's 
witnesses, the ALJ concluded that the testimony demonstrates 
that CSEA reviewed the matters complained about, made a good 
faith decision that the District acted within the confines of 
the collective bargaining agreement or past practices or made 
a good faith, responsible judgment that arbitration was not 
available because many of the grievances in question were 
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untimely. The ALJ determined that CSEA's handling of the 
grievances was in good faith and was not improperly 
motivated. The charging parties have filed exceptions to 
this determination. 
"TheT charge in Case No. U-8450 alleged that the District 
and CSEA violated the Act by continuing to negotiate for the 
at-issue employees during the pendency of the representation 
petition filed by the Union. The ALJ sustained that charge 
and found that the District and CSEA continued the 
negotiating process by presenting an agreement to their 
constituents for ratification after they were on notice that 
a bona fide question concerning representation had been 
raised. The District and CSEA have filed exceptions to that 
determination. 
The charge filed by the Union in Case No. U-8687 alleges 
that the District violated §§209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Act by implementing and enforcing a new attendance policy 
with the intent to interfere with and restrain employees from 
participating in the presentation of the Union's 
representation petition and prosecution of the improper 
practice charges filed by the Union and Monahan and 
Winiarski. The ALJ found that the promulgation of the 
attendance rules by the District was not improperly motivated 
and that the implementation of those rules through 
disciplinary proceedings against Monahan and Winiarski was 
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not improperly motivated. The ALJ did find, however, that 
the District acted with improper motivation in discharging 
two employees (Marie Forte and Nancy Brault) ostensibly 
because of their violation of the new attendance rules and 
insubordination. The Union and the District have filed 
exceptions to the ALJ's determination in this case. 
DISCUSSION 
The exceptions filed by the various parties raise the 
following questions for our consideration: 
1. Does the record support the Director's decision 
that the existing bargaining unit should not be 
fragmented? Does the record establish such a 
degree of conflict of interest among the employees 
in the negotiating unit and such inadequate 
representation of the part-time bus drivers who 
seek the separate unit as to warrant granting the 
petition? 
2. Did CSEA violate its duty of fair representation? 
Did it act improperly when it rejected the 
grievances as untimely or meritless? In this 
regard, should we overrule the ALJ's credibility 
determination in support of CSEA's witnesses? 
3. Did the District and CSEA violate the Act when they 
sought ratification of their agreement after they 
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were on notice that the Union had filed its 
petition? 
4. Were the disciplinary actions taken by the District 
against Monahan, Winiarski, Forte and Brault in 
violation' ofr"§T20'9-i-a7i:(;a>' and (c) of the "Act? 
The Director concluded that the Union failed to prove 
the existence of a conflict of interest or inadequate 
representation of a degree to warrant fragmentation. The 
Union argues that such a conclusion is contrary to the 
record. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the conclusion 
of the Director. There is no question that there are 
differences in benefit levels between the full-time employees 
of the District and the part-time employees. Such 
differences alone do not warrant the conclusion that there is 
a conflict of interest. In the absence of evidence that 
their representative has failed adequately to represent their 
interests, such differences also do not justify fragmentation 
of an established unit. We agree with the Director's 
findings that the part-time bus drivers were represented in 
the development of CSEA's negotiation proposals, that they 
were represented in negotiations, that several proposed 
benefits for them were pursued to fact-finding and that some 
were achieved. The record does not support a conclusion that 
CSEA has consistently abandoned the interests of the part-
timers in negotiations. 
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We also affirm the Director's and ALJ's findings that 
CSEA did not act improperly when it rejected the grievances 
filed by Monahan and Winiarski. There is no basis in this 
record for overruling the ALJ's credibility determination. 
The"testimony of"C^A's witness 
CSEA acted reasonably when it rejected the grievances as 
untimely or meritless. By the same token, we must conclude, 
as did the Director, that CSEA's handling of the grievances 
was not evidence of inadequate representation. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the Union has failed to prove the existence 
of a conflict of interest or inadequate representation of 
such a nature as would warrant fragmentation of the 
negotiating unit. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of its 
petition in Case No. C-3001. We also affirm the dismissal of 
the improper practice charges filed in Case Nos. U-8184 and 
U-8449. 
In Case No. U-8450, it was established that the Union 
filed a representation petition with this Board on 
November 1, 1985. This agency notified both CSEA and the 
District of the pending matter by mailing copies of the 
Notice of Conference and Hearing and copies of the petition 
to them on November 12, 1985. An agreement between the 
District and CSEA, covering the period July 1, 1985 through 
June 30, 1988, was executed on November 13, 1985. PERB's 
mailing was received by CSEA on November 13 and by the 
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District on November 15. Both the District and CSEA voted to 
ratify the agreement on November 20. 
The ALJ concluded that, since ratification is part of 
the negotiating process and did not take place until after 
notice of the union's petition was received by the parties, 
the act of ratification by both sides constituted a violation 
of §§209-a.l(a) and 209-a.2(a) of the Act. The ALJ • s 
determination is consistent with prior holdings of this 
Board.-3=/ We have long been of the view that an employer may 
not negotiate with an incumbent organization while a bona 
fide question concerning representation is pending. 
The District and CSEA note that our earlier decisions 
were based, at least in part, on a similar position 
originally held by the National Labor Relations Board.2/ 
They point out, however, that the NLRB has reversed its 
policy.-2/ The District and CSEA urge that we reconsider our 
policy and follow the NLRB by recognizing that the 
prohibition of negotiations until the representation 
proceeding is completed works an undue hardship on employers, 
unions and employees. 
VCounty of Rockland. 10 PERB f3098 (1977); Town of 
Brookhaven. 19 PERB 5f3004 and 3010 (1986). 
^/shea Chemical Corporation, 42 LRRM 1486 (1958). 
3-/RCA del Caribe. Inc.. 110 LRRM 1369 (1982). 
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We are not persuaded that our long-standing policy in 
this regard should be reversed. We continue to believe that 
the integrity of the election process and employer neutrality 
can better be achieved by prohibiting negotiations with the 
incumbent organization after a bona fide question concerning 
representation has been raised. On the other hand, we also 
recognize that our policy is appropriate only with regard to 
those employees who are directly affected by the 
representation petition. If the District and CSEA had 
ratified their agreement only with regard to the employees 
not included in the Union's petition, we would not find a 
violation of the Act. However, there is no evidence that the 
parties sought to limit their conduct in this regard. 
Consequently, we must affirm the ALJ's conclusion that by 
ratifying the agreement after they were on notice of the 
pendency of the petition, the District and CSEA violated 
§209-a.l(a) and §209-a.2(a), respectively, of the Act. 
Having reviewed the record, we also affirm the ALJ's 
conclusions with regard to the disciplinary actions taken by 
the District against Monahan, Winiarski, Forte and Brault, 
which are the subject of the charge in Case No. U-8687. A 
significant dispute in the testimony relates to whether or 
not the District imposed its attendance policies on the 
supporters of the Union in a discriminatory manner. That 
issue is largely resolved on the basis of the ALJ's finding 
Board - C-3001, U-8184, U-8449, U-8450, U-8687 -10 
that, in a memorandum issued on February 27, 1985, the 
District established a policy requiring all drivers to submit 
written leave requests for advance approval for all leaves, 
with or without pay. The A U also found that this policy was 
implemented prior to the 'events"complained'of herein. it 
follows, therefore, that the policy which the charging 
parties failed or refused to comply with was not promulgated 
for the purpose of interfering with the charging parties• 
rights. We affirm these findings of the AKT. 
Therefore, when Monahan and Winiarski notified the 
District orally, on February 11, 1986, that they would take 
the next day off to meet with their attorney concerning these 
PERB proceedings and when they notified the District orally 
on February 23 that they would attend a PERB conference on 
February 26, the District's denial of their leave requests, 
followed by the absence of Monahan and Winiarski from work on 
both days, could properly be the basis for the disciplinary 
reprimands issued by the District on both occasions. 
The first hearing in these proceedings took place on 
March 20, 1986. On March 7, Monahan was asked by his 
supervisor to supply the District with a list of the drivers 
he intended to call as witnesses at the hearing. Monahan 
said that he would need six to eight drivers as witnesses but 
refused to provide the District with their names. Monahan 
was warned that if there was any disruption of service, he 
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would be penalized. On March 19, Monahan and Winiarski 
served subpoenas, signed by Monahan, on several District 
employees directing them to appear the next day at the PERB 
hearing. The District notified all the subpoenaed employees 
that the subpoenas were invalid since they were sighed by 
Monahan and not by an attorney. The District directed all of 
the employees to report to work. Two of the subpoenaed 
employees, Forte and Brault, attended the hearing, missing 
their early runs. Monahan and Winiarski attended the 
hearing, again disregarding the District's policy requiring 
written request for leave. 
On March 21, Forte and Brault were suspended without 
pay and, on March 26, the District's Board discharged them. 
Formal disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 
were preferred against Monahan, charging him with failure to 
follow attendance procedures and disruption of service. As a 
result of the §75 hearing, Monahan received a 60-day 
suspension (in addition to a 30-day suspension pending the 
hearing). Winiarski received a reprimand for not following 
attendance procedures. 
We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that the evidence 
does not support a finding that the District pursued 
disciplinary action against Monahan and Winiarski with the 
intention of interfering with or restraining their Taylor Law 
rights. While the right of these employees to participate in 
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the various PERB proceedings is protected by the Act, that 
right must be exercised with due regard to the legitimate 
service needs and staff deployment concerns of the employer. 
While the employer may not unreasonably restrict the ability 
of the employees""to~lpa^ tic~ipate in the '"proceedings7" tRe ~ 
employees must comply with reasonable attendance rules. 
Inasmuch as the District's attendance rules were established 
well before the filing of the representation petition, we 
agree with the ALJ that the promulgation of the attendance 
rules was not improperly motivated. We also find that the 
record supports the ALJ's conclusion that the decision to 
discipline Monahan and Winiarski was not improperly 
) motivated. 
The ALJ found, however, that the penalty assessed 
against Forte and Brault for their insubordination violated 
§§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. The ALJ found that the 
penalty was inconsistent with the penalties assessed against 
other employees for not following the attendance procedures 
and failing to report to work as directed. Because the 
District offered no explanation for the severity of the 
penalty or the disparity of its treatment of Forte and 
Brault, the ALJ concluded that they were discharged by the 
District in retaliation for their appearance at the PERB 
hearing. 
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Undoubtedly, the District was correct in its conclusion 
that Monahan's subpoenas were invalid. Reliance by Forte and 
Brault on the subpoenas and their appearance at the hearing 
after being directed not to do so technically constituted 
insubordination. Nevertheless, they were only absent from work 
for two and one-half hours and actually performed their 
afternoon bus runs. There can be no question that the District 
was aware of the reason why they absented themselves from work, 
i.e., to appear at a PERB hearing pursuant to a subpoena. Even 
if the subpoenas were invalid, appearance at a PERB hearing is 
protected activity which can be' subject to employee discipline 
only if the employer acts in furtherance of legitimate management 
interests. The District has not explained why discharge under 
these circumstances was the appropriate response to the 
misconduct of Forte and Brault, as opposed to other available 
disciplinary responses. In the absence of such explanation, we 
must agree with the ALJ that Forte and Brault were terminated in 
retaliation for their appearance at the PERB hearing. 
Regarding the remaining allegations of the charge, we 
affirm the ALJ's finding that a supervisor's comments concerning 
authorization cards circulated on behalf of the Union cannot be 
attributed to the District and is not a basis for finding a 
violation of the Act by the District. We also agree that the 
District's refusal to permit Monahan on its premises during his 
suspension period was not improper under the Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
We find that the District and CSEA have violated 
§209-a.l(a) and §209-a.2(a), respectively, of the Act by 
ratifying the successor agreement during the pendency of a 
'"'-representation petition and thatrtheTDistrict;rE"as-'"violated""'" 
§§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by terminating Forte and 
Brault. Further, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the other 
allegations in Case No. U-8687, her dismissal of the charges in 
Case Nos. U-8184 and U-8449 in their entirety, and the 
Director's dismissal of the petition in Case No. C-3001. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
1. The District shall cease and desist from 
interfering with, restraining, coercing or 
' discriminating against its employees and CSEA 
shall cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining or coercing unit employees in the 
exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
2. The District and CSEA shall cease and desist from 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements for 
employees affected by a representation petition 
pending before PERB; 
3. The District shall offer reinstatement to Marie 
Forte and Nancy Brault, and make them whole for 
wages and benefits lost as a result of their 
discharge until such time as they are reinstated 
to employment or reject offers of reemployment, 
together with interest at the maximum legal rate, 
less interim earnings. Further, the District 
shall expunge from its personnel files all 
documents relating to their termination and, any 
reconsideration of disciplinary action against 
them shall be without regard to their protected 
activities; and 
4. The District and CSEA shall sign and 
post notice in the form attached at all 
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locations at which unit employees work, 
and places ordinarily used by them to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
'""l^ w*2*^ - & 4dut 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
,^PUBUC,£MPIJ0^MENT^ELAJ1ONS-B0ABD_^ 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Deer Park 
Unit, Suffolk Educational Chapter, Local 870, CSEA, Inc. that the 
Deer Park Union Free School District will: 
1. Not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against 
its employees in the exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
2. Not negotiate collective bargaining agreements for 
employees affected by a representation petition 
pending before PERB; 
3. Offer reinstatement to Marie Forte and Nancy Brault, 
and make, them whole for wages and benefits lost as a 
result of their discharge until such time as they are 
reinstated to employment or reject offers of reemployment, 
together with interest at the maximum legal rate, less 
interim earnings,, 
4. Expunge.from its personnel files all documents relating 
to their termination and any reconsideration of disciplinary 
action against them shall be without regard to their 
protected activities. 
Deer Park Union .Free. SchQOl. .District. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC-EMELOyMENLRELATIONS-BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Deer Park 
Unit, Suffolk Educational Chapter, Local 870, CSEA, Inc. that the 
CSEA will: 
1. Not interfere with, restrain or coerce unit employees in 
the exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
2. Not negotiate collective bargaining agreements for 
employees affected by a representation petition pending 
before PERB. 
Deer Park Unit, Suffolk Educational 
Chapter, Local 870, CSEA, Inc. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 852, AFSCME LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
'~-'~~" - and"- " CASE NO.~C=3333 
SAYVILLE LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 852, AFSCME Local 1000, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3333 page 2 
Unit I: 
Included: All full-time librarians, clerks, 
clerk/typists, account clerks and custodial 
workers. 
Excluded: Library director, senior clerk, pages and 
part-time employees. 
Unit II: 
Included: All part-time librarians, clerks, 
clerk/typists and custodial workers. 
Excluded: Library director, senior clerk, pages and 
full-time employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 852, AFSCME Local 1000, AFL-CIO. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman," Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUBSTITUTES UNITED IN BROOME, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NOT C-3 3 7 8 
UNION ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have 
received a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment as referenced in §201.7(d) of the 
Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
inclucLes the mutual obligation_tp_ meet _at reasonable times, and-
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
lbL*e^^ /£j&c 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ut^z^ ?r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




BINGHAMTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitutes United In 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have 
received a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment as referenced in §201.7(d) of the 
Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-3379 
^ 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet_at reasonable_times„ and, 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
') 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
#3D-3/l/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST ISLIP TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3442 
WEST ISLIP UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the West Islip Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
Certification - C-3442 page 2 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All registered nurses. 
Excluded: Health Services Coordinator (Head Nurse) and 
all other employees. 
- '''^~''Yu^B^T''YT'XS~:6RDEBEb that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the West Islip Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^Harold R. Newman, 
: /lf.£stsS7*i-^G-*. 
a Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member * 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
" -aricl- : ~ " "•""" CASE NOT C^3443 
VILLAGE OF SAUGERTIES, 
Employer, 
-and-
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL UNION NO. 445, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All police officers; sergeants and 
investigators. 
Excluded: Chief of police; captain; school crossing 
••-"-- — •""•-• -•-• guards7 ~ s^ecTaT patr^ 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
l ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORTATION AIDES OF BUFFALO, NEA/NY, 
NEA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3446 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 3488, AFSCME, 
Intervehor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Transportation Aides of 
Buffalo, NEA/NY, NEA has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
Certification - C-3446 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the title of bus aide. 
Excluded: All substitute bus aides and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Transportation Aides of 
Buffalo, NEA/NY, NEA. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Mosu^eJ^ r. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3G-3/l/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 834, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LIVERPOOL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
OFFICE PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION OF 
LIVERPOOL SCHOOLS, NEA/NY (OPALS), 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3459 
LIVERPOOL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 834, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matters by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Office Personnel Association 
of Liverpool Schools, NEA/NY (OPALS) has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
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employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Clerk I, Data Entry Equipment Operator, Library 
Clerk I, Photocopy Machine Operator I, 
Switchboard Operator, Word Processing Machine 
Op^rator,„jryrpist_„I^ 
Representative, Typist II, Word Processing 
Machine Operator/Center Coordinator, Account 
Clerk-Typist I, Audio Visual Specialist, Clerk 
I-Accounts Payable, Clerk II, School Secretary 
I, Account Clerk II, Duplicating Machine 
Operator, Personnel Aide, School Secretary II, 
Account Clerk III, Console Operator, Programmer 
I, Programmer II, Control Clerk, Attendance 
Assistant. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Office Personnel 
Association of Liverpool Schools, NEA/NY (OPALS). The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member  
#3H-3/l/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200-B, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3476 
CATO-MERIDIAN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 2 00-B has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full- and part-time teacher aides, teaching 
assistants and library assistants. 
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Excluded: Per diem substitutes, casual and temporary 
employees and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Service Employees 
~Intern^ 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 1, 1989 
Albany, New York 
?/5B-3/l/89 
N E W YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 W O L F ROAD 
PAULINE R. KINSELLA 
ALBANY, N E W YORK 12205 
(518) 457-2614 
February 7, 1989 
SPECIAL COUNSEL 
TO THE BOARD 
Joseph M. Bress , Esq. 
Execu t ive D i r ec to r 
N.Y.S. E t h i c s Commission 
S u i t e 1211 
11 North Pear l S t r e e t 
Albany, NY 12207 
Dear Mr. Bress : 
In accordance with Advisory Opinion 88-2, please find 
enclosed for filing a Code of Conduct applicable to per-diem 
members of the New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board. As you know, this agency has one Board only, which 
consists of a full-time Chairman and two per-diem members. 
One of the per-diem Board seats is currently vacant. 
If any further steps are needed to assure the compliance 
of this agency with the Advisory Opinion, please advise. 
Very truly yours, 
Pauline R. Kinsella 
Special Counsel to the Board 
PRK/mn 
cc: Harold R. Newman 
Walter L. Eisenberg f 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PER DIEM BOARD MEMBERS 
I. Restrictions covering business and professional 
activities by such members while serving on the Public 
Emp'lovment"~Relations -Board " ' •—• • -•••-•••'• •••••-—:-.-.---:::--:•—---- --.-_-—-.-•• 
Outside activities of the two part-time members of 
PERB may include the practice of law and arbitration. 
However, such members of PERB may not represent clients in 
public sector labor-related matters under the jurisdiction of 
the Taylor Law and they may not accept arbitration 
assignments involving parties subject to the Taylor Law. 
They may accept arbitration assignments involving unions that 
are affiliated with other unions that represent public 
employees; for example, it would not be a violation of this 
policy for one of such Board members to accept a labor 
arbitration assignment involving a local of the Teamsters or 
the SEIU by reason of the fact that both organizations have 
Locals that represent, or are seeking to represent, employees 
subject to the Taylor Law, so long as the Local involved in 
the arbitration does not. 
II • Restrictions on post-service appearances before the 
Public Employment Relations Board 
a. No person who has been [a member] of the Board 
shall engage in practice before the Board or its agents in 
any respect in connection with any case or proceeding which 
was pending during the time of his employment with the Board. 
b. No person who has been [a member] of the Board 
shall engage in practice before the Board or its agents in 
any respect in connection with any case or proceeding not 
pending during his employment, for a period of six months 
after his employment with the Board has terminated.-2/ 
•i/This policy was enacted by resolution of the Board on 
June 24, 1976. 
^-/This policy is codified at §215.2 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board. 
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Ill. Enforcement procedures 
Any complaint of violation of this code of conduct 
shall be submitted in writing to the Chairman. The Chairman 
shall refer any such complaints to the New York State Ethics 
Commission for its investigation and recommendation to the 
Chairman concerning the action to be taken, if any, in 
